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Abstract 
The study focuses on the political economy of oil resources management in Nigeria with the 
sole purpose of showcasing how far the country has gone in effectively managing its crude oil 
proceeds. It presents a brief history on the excess crude account as well as the sovereign 
wealth fund in Nigeria and then presents the models of excess oil resource management of 
some other countries. This is to enable Nigeria to draw some lessons and then take steps that 
guarantees the sustenance of growth and development. 
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1. Introduction 
The quest to develop the Nigerian economy from crude oil proceeds has not achieved the 
desired results due to several challenges plaguing the oil sector. Since the discovery of crude 
oil in Nigeria, the country is still hindered by financial and economic challenges due to the 
mismanagement of crude oil proceeds accruing to the country. In fact, the country is ranked 
among the most corrupt countries in the world due to the activities of public office holders 
who consistently syphoned crude oil proceeds. Consequent on this, efforts to diversify the 
economy has remained largely a mirage. During the periods of huge oil earnings when a 
barrel of crude oil was sold for over 100 US dollars, the country failed to make provision for 
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the macroeconomic shocks that unexpected oil price movements could cause (Eregha and 
Mesagan, 2017).  
 
Despite the recommendation of the international agencies for a sovereign wealth fund which 
is a state-owned investment fund, where earnings from excess crude could be pooled for 
future use (Tsani, 2013; Mehrpouya, 2015; Isola et al., 2017; Charles et al., 2018; Mesagan et 
al., 2019), the failed in this regard. Nigeria, as a country, was unable to build its sovereign 
wealth fund to a point where it could provide the needed stabilization it requires against 
shocks from international crude oil price fluctuations. The experiences of other oil producing 
countries, such as Norway and Kuwait, have shown that the sovereign wealth fund can serve 
as a catalyst for economic stability in providing the needed economic cushioning when crude 
oil price crashes internationally. Lack of political will in effectively managing crude oil 
wealth in Nigeria has placed serious limitation on the country’s effort to diversify its 
productive base, thereby inhibiting its quest to move from being a mono-product to a multi-
product economy (Eregha et al., 2015; Mesagan, 2015). The huge Petro-dollars earned by the 
country on daily basis, in the recent past, has made Nigeria to consistently run on budget 
deficit. In fact, the country is listed among the major oil producing countries that run on 
budget deficits all the time (Isola and Mesagan, 2014; Ufuoma & Omoruyi, 2014; Emodi & 
Boo, 2015; Omojolaibi et al., 2016; Mesagan and Dauda, 2016). 
 
Moreover, disagreement between the government, oil marketers and organised labour over 
fuel subsidy is another issue negatively affecting the country. It is an on-going debate 
whether fuel subsidy regime should come to an end or not, owing to the country’s loss of 
revenue from the fall in crude oil prices. In a response to this, the Federal government of 
Nigeria recently reviewed upward the pump price of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) from 
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N86.50 to a ceiling of N145 and this did not go down well with the major faction of the 
Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) which down-tool for few days before it was eventually 
called-off. It is in this light that this present study attempts to investigate the political 
economy of crude oil management in Nigeria by taking a clue from the experiences of other 
oil resource abundant countries, which have been able to surmount both the resource curse 
and Dutch disease syndromes by diversifying their economies. 
 
To this end, this is a policy paper that sets out to review how Nigeria has managed its crude 
oil proceeds since oil discovery, with a view to analyse the behaviour of the Nigeria’s macro-
economy and oil revenue up to date. It also undertakes a critical review of oil resources 
management models adopted so far and present models from other resource abundant 
economies to draw lessons that can assist the country in instituting an appropriate oil resource 
management model for economic diversification. 
 
2. Review of Role of Institutions in Oil Resource Management  
Empirical studies have suggested that a very important factor in resource management and 
economic development is strong institutions and good governance (Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004; Ahmadov, Mammadov, & Aslanli, 
2013; Eregha & Mesagan, 2016). This is because when institutions are weak, good 
governance will be lacking and effective management of resources -both natural and human- 
becomes a mirage. More insightful studies of Mehlum, Karl, & Ragnar (2006), and 
Azhgaliyeva (2014) explained in detail the decisive role that institutional quality and 
governance play in ensuring effective resource management for economic development. 
According Mehlum et al (2006), even when institutional settings are entirely persistent and 
did not affect oil and gas discovery, institutional quality are still very decisive. Bulte, 
Richard, & Robert (2005), Stevens & Dietsche (2008), Beland & Tiagi (2009), Perry & 
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Olivera (2009), and Wizarat (2013) affirmed in their studies that good governance and strong 
institutions can enable resource-endowed nations turn resource curse into resource blessing. 
The studies confirmed that economic growth and natural resources have positive interactions 
and spill overs between them. They however, agreed that corruption, poor governance and 
rent seeking are observed in countries with weak institutions that can trigger conflict. The 
notion that poor governance and deteriorating institutions cause problems in resource rich 
countries is also supported by Kolstad & Soreide (2009). 
 
Having established the important role of good governance and institutions in resource rich 
nations, studies in economic literature have gone further to compare the performance of 
resource abundant countries that are mono-product like Nigeria with that of export-
diversified countries. For instance, Mehlum et al (2006), Brunnschweiler & Bulte (2008), 
Wizarat (2013), as well as, Mesagan and Bello (2018) found that resource abundant countries 
have lower long run rates of growth than countries with a more diversified export structure. It 
thus follows that poor management of oil proceeds caused by weak institutions have negative 
effect on the export performance and economic growth of resource rich nations. Studies in 
the line of thought that weak institutions prevent resource abundant countries to diversify 
their export structure include Sachs & Warner (1995), Kronenberg (2004), Collier & Hoeffler 
(2009) and Eregha & Mesagan (2016). The argument is that when the proceed from a natural 
resource, is mismanaged, it reduces the amount of resources available in diversifying the 
export base of the economy, cripples export performance, and lowers long run growth. Apart 
from these studies, others such as Tsani (2013) investigated the role of institutional quality, 
governance and resource funds in resource-abundant economies. The study which was driven 
by the controversial debate on the inability of resource funds in addressing the resource curse, 
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observed that resource funds are veritable tools for improving governance and for addressing 
the institutional deterioration in resource-endowed nations.  
 
From the foregoing, it is important to stress that several of the studies that have been 
reviewed in this study have solely beamed searchlight on the role of quality institutions in the 
management of natural resource proceeds. To mention a few, studies like Rodrik et al (2004) 
and Ahmadov et al (2013), only traced the discourse of effective resource management to 
institutional quality while Mehlum et al (2006) and Azhgaliyeva (2014) focused on the role 
of institution in promoting economic development through resource abundance. In addition, 
studies like Beland & Tiagi (2009), Perry & Olivera (2009), and Wizarat (2013), only 
investigated how resource-endowed nations can turn resource curse into resource blessing via 
the institution channel, while Sachs & Warner (1995), Kronenberg (2004), as well as, Collier 
& Hoeffler (2009), linked countries’ ability to diversify their export structure to the strength 
of their prevailing institutions. It is obvious that these studies have focused more on natural 
resource abundance and not solely on oil resource, in which Nigeria is well endowed. Other 
studies have been mostly empirical, but this is a policy paper to address a pertinent issue 
currently affecting the Nigerian economy. In addition, the management of resource wealth 
has not been given considerable attention in the literature, and this is very important, 
especially in a country like Nigeria. Hence, the need to fill this noticeable gap by examining 
the political economy of managing oil proceeds in an oil resource abundant economy like 
Nigeria.    
 
3. Research Methodology 
To assess the political economy of oil resource management in Nigeria, this study employs 
strictly descriptive and exploratory research approach. The advantage of using the descriptive 
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methodology is hinged on the fact that it makes it possible to analyse the trend of various 
indicators and paint a clearer picture. Furthermore, the study’s quest to analyse the situation 
in other oil-producing countries with a view recommend appropriate policies for Nigeria in 
effectively managing its crude oil proceeds informs the use of the exploratory research 
approach. Hence, to examine the efficiency of oil resource management in Nigeria, the study 
uses graphs and average annual performance of key economic indicators like the real gross 
domestic product, crude oil price, exchange rate, inflation rate, and crude oil benchmark 
prices. The study also relates the trend of crude oil production to a social indicator like the 
poverty rate to add some social dimension to the discussion. 
 
4. Oil Proceeds and the Nigerian Macroeconomic Indicators 
In section 2, it is evident that proper management of oil resources can provide impetus for 
stimulating the long run growth of an economy and can also serve as a catalyst to diversifying 
the export base of a nation.  
  
   Source: Authors Computation from WDI (2017) 
In figures 1 and 2, it is evident that the main driver of Nigeria’s growth is crude oil export. 
Between 1970 and 2014, crude oil price has been highly volatile, and its effect can be seen very 
clearly in terms of the performance of the economy as GDP growth rate took a big deep between 
the early 1980s as oil price fluctuates. Especially, between early 1980s and early 1990s, when 
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FIG. 1: AVERAGE CRUDE OIL PRICE
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Fig. 2: Real GDP Per Capita
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crude oil earnings for the country revolved around the $20 US mark, GDP per capita in Nigeria 
was also very low revolving below $600 US dollar mark. However, between the early 2000s and 
lately 2014, before the late downward trend up to date, the GDP per capita in Nigeria has received 
a boost moving close to as high as around $1000 US dollar mark. This implies that the Nigerian 
economy has been solely dependent on happenings in the international crude oil price and if not 
well managed, it exposed the economy to serious external shocks. 
   
   Source: Authors Computation from WDI (2017) 
In the same vein, inflation rate in Nigeria as seen in figure 3 was somewhat high in the late 
1980s up to the early 1990s, however, efforts on the part of government to maintain a single 
inflation digit has seen the country improved significantly while being able to keep inflation 
below the 10% rate between mid-1990s to early 2000. Despite the occasional surge in 
inflation rate between 2001 and 2005, Nigeria has been able to maintain a single digit 
inflation rate on the average up to 2014 before the latest fall in the international crude oil 
price. A striking feature of exchange rate was noticed in figure 4 as the trend of exchange rate 
shows that the naira to dollar exchange rate has continued to rise significantly since the early 
1990s up to date. The post 2014 trend, which is the period of the current international shock 
in crude oil price, has seen the naira exchanging for over N300 to one US dollar at some 
point. This also has some implication for the inflation rate presented in figure 3 as the 
inflation rate in 2016 has now gone extremely beyond 15% in the first quarter of the year. 
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This can be attributed to the inability of the economy to effectively manage the shock it is 
exposed to from the ongoing international crude oil crises.  
   
   Source: Authors Computation from WDI (2017) 
 
Despite the huge oil earnings that Nigeria has garnered in the past, most of the citizenry are 
still very poor. In figure 6, between 1990 up to 2014, Nigeria has maintained a little above 2 
million barrels of crude oil export per day. However, the poverty level of the citizens, as 
presented in figure 5, remains very pathetic. Presented in terms of the proportion of 
population living on a less than $1.90 per day, about 46% and 57% people were poor in 1985 
and 1992 respectively. This rose to about 63.5% in 1996 before stagnating at about 53.46% 
and 53.47% respectively in 2003 and 2009. It thus shows that efforts by the Federal 
government to effectively manage the excess crude to galvanise investment and secure a 
better future for the citizens have not yielded any benefit due to corruption and 
mismanagement of funds. 
46.01
57.06
63.5
53.46 53.47
1985 1992 1996 2003 2009
%
 o
f 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
n
 le
ss
 t
h
an
 $
1
.9
0
 
p
e
r 
d
ay
Fig. 5: Poverty Rate
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
6
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
6
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
4
M
ill
io
n
s 
P
er
 B
ar
re
l
Fig. 6: Oil Production
9 
 
   
   Source: World Development Indicators (2015) 
 
In figure 7, the growth rate of GDP in Nigeria has remained fairly stable at an average of 6% per 
annum with the exception of few years in the early 1970s and lately. In fact, GDP growth in the 
country, which was pegged at about 6.3% in 2014, slumped to about 2.8% in 2015 due to the 
recent oil price fall. According to the global forecast, the country’s GDP growth in the first 
quarter of 2016 was -0.5%. This is not a good indicator for an economy if the current trend is not 
halted. In figure 8, crude oil price lately has shown some positive relationship with inflation rate 
as noticed in the economy between 2015 and 2016. This is caused by the rise in importation bills, 
and it has negative implications on the import dependent economy.  
 
Source: Authors’ Computation from Federal Ministry of Finance 
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Figure 9 indicates that Nigeria’s crude oil earnings outweighed the benchmark price of crude 
oil between 2004 and 2015. The country recorded excess oil earnings, which are expected to 
be kept in the excess crude account (ECA) and used for safe guarding the economy against 
any international shock. It is only in 2008 during the global economic melt-down when crude 
oil price fell sharply that the country’s benchmark surpassed the oil price, and then the ECA 
was used to bail the economy back to recovery. However, the Sovereign wealth fund, which 
replaced the ECA in 2011, is not able to protect the country against economic shock it 
currently witnesses. Poor management of oil proceeds and corruption have caused the 
inability of the country to save in periods of bountifulness. 
 
5. Nigeria’s Management of Crude Oil Proceeds: The Sovereign Wealth Fund 
To manage excess crude oil earnings in Nigeria, the Excess Crude Account (ECA) was 
created in 2004. It was meant for saving crude oil earnings more than crude oil benchmark 
price. It was meant to protect planned budgets against deficits that are due to international oil 
price volatility and prevents the country’s economy from external shocks. Between 2005 and 
2008, the ECA grew by almost 400% from $5.1 billion to about $20 billion respectively 
owing to the surging rise in the international crude oil prices. However, by June 2010, its 
value declined to about $4 billion due to a fall in crude oil prices internationally and budget 
deficits was recorded across the nation. This led to the approval of the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund (SWF) by the country’s National Economic Council in 2010 to replace the ECA. The 
Excess Crude Account on its own was very good, as it assisted the country to boost its 
external reserves. It also provided impetus for stabilising the economy during the global 
financial meltdown of 2008 and 2009. It however suffered a great setback as the National 
Assembly and subnational governments in the country saw the ECA as a creation of the 
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Federal executive. They, therefore, challenged its existence as it was not contained in the 
country’s constitution (CBN, 2012).   
 
To address the shortcoming of the ECA, the Sovereign Wealth Fund was established by the 
Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) Act in 2011. Through this Act, the SWF was 
charged with receiving, managing and investing the revenues of Federal, State and Local 
government in a diversified portfolio of medium term and long term. This is to prepare for 
the eventual depletion of the country’s oil resources. The Fund is also to provide stability for 
the economy during economic shocks, facilitates the building of infrastructures and provides 
a saving base for Nigerians. To this end, the Federal, State and Local government councils 
contributed an initial $1 billion, according to the federal allocation formula of the Federation 
Account, and it is to be managed by the NSIA. Subsequent funding is expected to come from 
Residual Funds from the Federation Account NSIA in a mode specified in the Act, so long as 
the derivation portion of the revenue allocation formula is not included as part of the funding. 
After receiving revenue into the Federation Account every month, the NSIA is funded from 
all amounts of residual funds above the budgetary smoothing amount. It thus means that 
every other revenue that accrues to all levels of government, apart from the excess crude, is 
also made available to fund. Moreover, only revenues earned from the sales of crude oil at the 
benchmarked price of the Federal budget for a particular year is shared among all the 
federating units (CBN, 2012). Every other revenue, minus deductions specified, is transferred 
to the NSIA for investment in the Funds. The Authority can also be funded by the returns on 
investment it made. To execute its operations, the NSIA has three operations, which include 
Future Generation Fund (FGF), Nigeria Infrastructure Fund (NIF) and Stabilisation Fund as 
shown in figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Diagram of ECA and SWF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Adapted from CBN, 2012. 
 
6. Lessons from other Oil Producing Countries 
6.1 The Norwegian Experience 
The experience of Norway shows that its Sovereign Wealth Fund is managed by the 
Government Pension Fund Authority (GPFA). The Fund keeps the excess wealth generated 
by the Norwegian petroleum earnings. Based on 2008 valuation, the fund was the second 
largest in the world and the largest in Europe. It is among the most transparent sovereign 
wealth fund in the whole world. The GPFA is not a pension fund actually because it derives 
its financial strength from oil earnings and not pensioners. The GPFA was established after 
oil was discovered in Norway around the North Sea in 1969 by the Norwegian act of 
parliament known as Government Petroleum Fund Act. The first transfer to the fund was 
Crude Oil Price (COP) Oil Price Benchmark (OPB) 
Excess Crude Account 
(ECA) = (COP-OPB) 
Sovereign Wealth 
Fund (SWF) 
Future 
Generation 
(FGF) 
Stabilization 
Fund  
Nigeria 
Infrastructure 
Fund (NIF) 
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made in 1996, and as it is today, the Fund has an investment amount up to the tune of $873 
billion as at 2015 (SWFI1, 2015). Its main objective is to facilitate government savings that is 
necessary to meet the rapid increase in public pension expenditures and to support a long-
term management of oil proceeds. It invests in international real estate up to the tune of 5%, 
fixed income and equities but not in private equities. The activities of the Fund have enabled 
the country to generate significant financial assets in the Government Pension Fund. The 
Fund is expected to invest 60% into equities and 40% into fixed income instruments. This is 
expected to cover two geographical regions with Norwegian region taking about 85% and the 
Nordic region, excluding Iceland, taking about 15% (CBN, 2012). 
 
6.2 The Chinese Experience 
In China, Sovereign Wealth Fund is given to three fund managers to manage. The Fund 
managers include the China Investment Corporation, National Social Security Fund and 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio. The Sovereign wealth is well managed 
to the extent that the total value of its portfolio of assets amounts to about $746.7 billion in 
2015 (SWFI, 2015; Mesagan et al., 2018). The main aim of the Chinese Fund is to ensure the 
maximisation of profits at an acceptable level of risk. It was also designed to improve the 
corporate strategy governance of important financial institutions owned by the government. 
The Fund participate in indirect equity holdings through various investment funds and make 
use of external money managers. Part of the SWF in China is used for bailing out certain 
government enterprises when it is necessary and provided some economic stability in the 
process. It is also invested in international assets in Asia, Australia, Africa and North 
America. The fund has some asset allocation in some developed and emerging economies, 
real estate, infrastructure, corporate debt, sovereign debt and hedge funds (CBN, 2012). 
 
1 Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute Ranking, 2015. (Available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings). 
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6.3 The Kuwait’s Experience 
Kuwait has the oldest SWF in the world as it was founded in 1953. To bring this Fund to top 
speed, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) was established in 1982 to take over the role 
of managing all the assets of Kuwait’s government. The funds manage by KIA is of two 
folds, namely: The Future Generations Fund (FGF) and the General Reserve Fund (GRF). 
The General Reserve Fund serves as the main treasurer for the government as it receives all 
government’s revenues from oil and gas and other sources and it also pays out all national 
expenditures. The GRF holds all national assets, including that of the Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation and Kuwait’s participation in multilateral organizations like the Arab Fund, the 
IMF and the World Bank. The FGF, on the other hand, was established in 1976 through a 
transfer of 50% of the GRF’s assets and its early function was to invest in external assets 
outside Kuwait. By the Kuwait’s law, 10% of government revenues are to be transferred to 
the FGF annually. The KIA can also manage other funds that the Ministry of Finance 
entrusted to it (CBN, 2012). Currently, Kuwait’s sovereign wealth is over $592 billion in 
2015 (SWFI, 2015). 
 
6.4 The United Arab Emirates’ Experience 
Unlike the earlier SWFs discussed, the United Arab Emirate (UAE) has its sovereign wealth 
fund managed by different fund managers that include Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, 
International Petroleum Investment Company, Investment Corporation of Dubai and 
Mubadala Development Company, among others. The quest for the effective management of 
excess proceeds from oil exports necessitated the establishment of the different authorities. 
They are to set up manage and invest funds on behalf of the government of different Emirates 
in UAE, as well as, guarantee and stabilise the future welfare of the Emirates (CBN, 2012). 
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Currently, the total sovereign wealth fund for the country is around $773 billion in 2015 
(SWFI, 2015). 
 
7. Conclusion 
Sequel to the discussion in this paper, it is important to note that Nigeria still has a long way 
to go in a quest to effectively maintain a sovereign wealth fund that can compare with those 
of the other performing oil-rich nations. Experience so far has shown that the country is very 
weak in maintaining very strong fiscal rules that can galvanise proper management of oil 
proceeds for diversification. A well-managed sovereign wealth fund would have been able to 
assist the country in diversifying its export base and serve as a buffer against oil price 
volatility. To this end, corruption must be reduced to the barest minimum for the country to 
be able to get out of the current economic quagmire. Also, every stake holder must be ready 
to make sacrifices to ensure that the little that is left over from the crumbs can be put together 
to make the sovereign wealth fund more effective. Sacrifices are also needed to make the 
SWF to achieve its purpose of boosting the investment base of the nation and make funds 
available for economic diversification. This will make it possible to bring the economy back 
on the path of growth and development.   
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